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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, both courts and legislatures have increas-
ingly scrutinized civil commitment statutes and the practice of hospi-
talizing the mentally ill. Although reform has focused primarily on
the imposition of new procedures for involuntary civil commitment,
substantive changes in the law have also occurred.' Disenchanted
with traditional subjective "clinical" standards2 that depend on fallible
* B.A. 1973, University of Washington; M.S.W. 1974, University of Michigan; J.D.
1984, University of Puget Sound; LL.M. Candidate 1984-85, University of
Michigan.
1. Dix, Major Current Issues Concerning Civil Commitment Criteria, 45 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 138 (1982). The increased involvement of the legal system
in the civil commitment process has resulted in the imposition of both substantive
and procedural restraints to restrict coerced hospitalization of the mentally ill,
protect patient rights, and reduce arbitrary application of vague and overbroad
commitment criteria. Id at 139. See also Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The
Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAIF. L.
REV. 54, 55 n.8. (1982).
2. Clinical standards used to commit mentally ill individuals generally were derived
from the "medical model" that supported hospitalization of individuals who re-
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psychiatric judgments, 3 most courts and legislatures now require a
finding of "dangerousness" to justify coerced hospitalization. 4
The concept of "dangerousness" has spurred considerable debate in
recent psychiatric and legal literature. By substituting customary
clinical commitment criteria with the contemporary "dangerousness"
standard, courts and legislatures seem to assume that such a criterion
is more precise and limited, thus reducing the risk of erroneous deten-
tion.5 Numerous studies have emerged, however, to demonstrate that
psychiatric predictions of dangerousness are not reliable and do not
identify accurately potentially violent individuals. Despite these em-
pirical findings, most courts continue to permit psychiatric expert tes-
timony regarding potential dangerousness to self or others to justify
the exercise of the state's coercive power to hospitalize the mentally
ill.6
quired care and treatment based on a diagnosable mental illness. Decisions re-
garding the necessity for treatment and/or hospitalization, although in theory
conforming to statutory requirements, rested almost entirely on the discretion of
mental health professionals. See Morse, supra note 1, at 54. See generally
Chodoff, The Case for Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 133 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 496, 497-501 (1976).
In the last several decades, both civil liberty lawyers and some physicians have
rejected the medical model as an assertion of social control by states and psychia-
trists over individuals who exhibit annoying or socially unacceptable behavior.
I& at 497.
3. Chodoff, supra note 2, at 499. The author agrees that "medical model criteria are
'soft' and subjective," thus often depending on the "fallible judgment of
psychiatrists."
4. See Dix, supra note 1, at 140. Dix notes that those dissatisfied with traditional
standards such as "need of care and treatment" have found the criteria that the
proposed patient be dangerous to others to be a "conceptually satisfying standard
for commitment." But see Chodoff, supra note 2, at 499 (arguing that any possible
"fuzziness" of the medical model approach is not ameliorated by the adoption of
the supposed "objective" criteria of dangerousness nor are lawyers or judges "any
less fallible than psychiatrists").
Most states currently authorize hospitalization based on some "dangerous-
ness" scheme. Although definitions vary, most statutes permit "preventive" de-
tention upon evidence that an individual is mentally ill and poses some likelihood
or risk of harm to him or herself or to others. For a recent overview of all state
civil commitment statutes, see Beis, State Involuntary Commitment Statutes, 7
MENTAL Dis. L. REP. 358 (1983). Many states also authorize involuntary commit-
ment based on either a "gravely disabled" criterion or some variation reflecting
an individual's inability to care for him or herself. "Gravely disabled" may, in
some states, require a finding of dangerousness to self. Under those circum-
stances, this Article will be relevant to such standards and the admissibility of
evidence to establish the functional fact of "dangerousness."
5. Dix, supra note 1, at 143.
6. Albers, Pasewark, & Meyer, Involuntary Hospitalization and Psychiatric Testi-
mony: The Fallibility of the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP. U.L.
REV. 11, 30 (1976). The authors contend that "despite the vast array of evidence
suggesting the unreliability of psychiatric diagnosis and of the predictive capabil-
ity of psychiatrists, the courts nevertheless, and surprisingly, continue to rely
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The United States Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the
constitutionality of police power commitments based on a "dangerous-
ness" standard. It has, however, intimated that it would sustain the
involuntary commitment of dangerous mentally ill individuals as a le-
gitimate exercise of the state's authority to confine those persons who
pose a threat to themselves or the community. 7 More importantly, the
Court has never considered whether psychiatric opinions and predic-
tions of future dangerous conduct may be admitted into evidence to
establish the functional basis for the state to assert its police power.
This Article will examine several Supreme Court decisions and
survey recent literature and caselaw to ascertain whether the Court
would uphold the use of psychiatric opinions in civil commitment pro-
ceedings. It will conclude that despite the empirical evidence that
questions psychiatric expertise and the potential for erroneous con-
finement, the Supreme Court will continue to permit psychiatrists and
other mental health professionals to proffer such testimony. This Ar-
ticle will further postulate that the Court should not, and will not,
restrict or limit psychiatric opinions and judgments as to dangerous-
ness, but rather should trust the adversarial process to ferret out relia-
ble from unreliable evidence in both short-term and indeterminate
commitment proceedings.
II. OVERVIEW
Civil commitment of the mentally ill has traditionally been based
on two substantive rationales: the state's police power and parens pa-
triae authority.8 Under the police power, a state has a legitimate in-
terest in protecting its citizens from individuals whose dangerous
heavily on such testimony in cases of involuntary hospitalization." They contend
that "courts have not responded to the fallibility of psychiatric testimony by as-
suming responsibility for judicial determinations that philosophically and legally
reside with them," and suggest further that the legal profession and the courts
have therefore "surrendered a major segment of their role in decision making
regarding involuntary hospitalization .... " IM at 30-31.
Note that other mental health professionals such as psychologists, social
workers, and psychiatric nurses may also testify in court proceedings. Because
most of the literature focuses on psychiatric expertise, this Article is limited to
the testimony of pshychiatrists, although it is perhaps relevant to other profes-
sionals as well.
7. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (regarding "mental illness,"
stating that assuming that the term can be given reasonably precise content and
that the mentally ill can be identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no
constitutional basis for confining individuals if they are not dangerous and can
live safely in freedom). See also infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
8. For a thorough discussion on the theories of civil commitment, see La Fond, An
Examination of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 BUFFALO L.
REV. 499, 501-506 (1981), and Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment
of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974).
1985)
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tendencies are inimical to public welfare. The notion of protective pa-
ternalism fostered the theory that a state has a duty under its parens
patriae authority to care for patients unable to care for themselves.
Courts have increasingly begun to limit state authority, recognizing
that civil commitment of the mentally ill involves a severe deprivation
of liberty engendering serious adverse social consequences to the indi-
vidual.9 Efforts to limit the broad scope of state power have resulted
in both substantive and procedural reforms. State action, depriving an
individual of liberty, may only be justified when the state has a "com-
pelling interest" that outweighs an individual's fundamental right to
liberty.10 Within this limited area of legitimate state action, strict pro-
cedural safequards are required."'
Despite the narrowing of substantive standards and the increase in
procedural safeguards, some critics continue to characterize current
police power and parens patriae commitment schemes as unconstitu-
tionally vague, thereby providing inadequate notice and warning to in-
dividuals as to what conduct may lead to confinement.12 A companion
criticism reflects concern that commitment criteria are overbroad and
thus permit detention in the absence of sufficiently compelling gov-
ernmental interests.'3 These legal attacks, along with the increased
9. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (acknowledging that commitment to a
mental institution entails a "massive curtailment of liberty"). See also Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979) (reaffirming that civil commitment for any
purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty and finding it indisputable
that adverse consequences such as "stigma" can have a significant impact on the
individual patient). In Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1089 (E.D. Wis.
1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on remand, 379 F. Supp.
1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957
(1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976), the district
court noted that a former mental patient may encounter serious obstacles when
attempting to find employment, sign a lease, or buy a house. Id. at 1089. Patients
confined to mental hospitals may also be deprived of friends and family and be
subjected against their will to intrusive kinds of treatment and therapy that may
violate their right to bodily integrity. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 626 (1979)
(Brennan J., dissenting).
10. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (E.D. Wis. 1972); In re Levias,
83 Wash. 2d 253, 257, 517 P.2d 588 (1973). See also La Fond, supra note 8, at 519.
11. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1094 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See also Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (holding that involuntary commitment proceed-
ings require due process protections).
12. La Fond, supra note 8, at 516, cites Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1976),
as an example of a court finding a statute permitting the state to involuntarily
commit mentally ill persons in need of care and treatment because of a mental
disability to be "unconstitutionally vague." The author observes that, although
most courts have not accepted the argument, the lack of specificity with respect
to "dangerousness" criteria presents a strong case that police power commitments
are also unconstitutionally vague because the standards fail to provide adequate
notice to individuals. La Fond, supra note 8, at 510.
13. Dix, supra note 1, at 138. The constitutional doctrine of overbreadth is a substan-
tive due process issue that requires judicial assessment of the legislative criterion
[Vol. 64:215
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recognition of the hazards of involuntary commitment, including poor
hospital conditions, the lack of treatment, and the collateral effects on
civil rights, have led many courts to require a showing of "dangerous-
ness" before permitting coerced hospitalization of the mentally ill.14
Use of a "dangerousness" standard demonstrates both judicial and
legislative development of a primarily legal analytic framework and a
substantial rejection of psychiatric concerns.1 5 The "dangerousness"
standard, however, remains elusive, ambiguous, and perhaps artificial
because of the unlikelihood of accurate application.6 Most state stat-
utes do not define dangerousness with any precision or specificity.17
Thus, state officials possess extraordinary discretion in their commit-
ment decisions.1 8 Most statutes also do not define the type or the
gravity of harm necessary to justify commitment under a dangerous-
ness standard.19 Further, statutes are generally silent with respect to
to insure that commitment is supported by a sufficiently compelling governmen-
tal interest. Id. Some critics have classified police power commitments as pre-
ventive detention, therefore effectuating a loss of liberty to prevent potential
future harm. See La Fond, supra note 8, at 510. Because the individual is de-
tained based on potential behavior rather than for an act already committed, the
resultant risk of error is higher. Thus, the possible over-inclusiveness of these
standards questions whether the state's interest is sufficiently compelling to sanc-
tion the individual loss of liberty. Id. at 510-13.
14. Weissbourd, Involuntary Commitment, The Move Toward Dangerousness, 15 J.
MAR. 83, 84 (1982). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia was among the first to require a "dangerousness" criterion for civil commit-
ment. See, e.g., Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Millard v. Harris,
406 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
15. Weissbourd, supra note 14, at 86. Concern over traditional clinical commitment
procedures that merely required certification by a physician and little or no judi-
cial review prompted both courts and legislatures to develop more "objective"
legal criteria. Rejecting the "almost blanket parens patriae justification" of need
for care and treatment, courts began to require "dangerousness to self and
others" as the necessary standard for involuntary commitment. Miller & Fid-
dleman, Involuntary Civil Commitment in North Carolina: The Result of the
1979 Statutory Changes, 60 N.C.L. REv. 985, 986-89 (1982). The "dangerousness"
criterion, with its greater reliance on the police power, developed as a substitute
for the potential abuses of parens patriae commitment schemes and thus as a
limitation on psychiatrists' power to confine individuals solely for care and treat-
ment. Weissbourd, supra note 14, at 86.
16. As one author indicates, a "dangerousness" standard may lack some of the defects
of the traditional "need of care and treatment" standard, yet continues to "pres-
ent real problems of overbreadth, equal treatment, and precision." Dix, supra
note 1, at 140. See also infra Section II (discussing the empirical evidence demon-
strating that psychiatrists and other mental health professionals are prone to
over-predicting dangerousness). Without narrow and more precise statutory cri-
teria, courts are also able to interpret, at their whim, what behavior is serious
enough to trigger application of the commitment statute and, therefore, the de-
tention of the individual.
17. See La Fond, supra note 8, at 510.
18. 1a at 510-11.
19. Dix, supra note 1, at 141. Dix indicates that some statutes merely refer to "harm"
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both the likelihood of harm and the predictive level of accuracy that
must be attained to avoid arbitrary application of the criterion.2 0
Introduction of the "dangerousness" concept has not altered tradi-
tional reliance on psychiatric expert testimony in commitment pro-
ceedings.2 1 Courts and juries tend to defer to the judgments and
recommendations of psychiatrists because of their supposed expertise
to diagnose and predict accurately a patient's future behavior.22 More-
over, courts have often been relegated to mere review of psychiatric
decisions since they lack knowledge and expertise in the mental
health field.23 Because of this deference to psychiatric opinions, the
admissibility of such testimony on the issue of dangerousness has be-
come a vital concern in the civil commitment arena.
III. THE CRITICISM OF PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT TESTIMONY
Many commentators have concluded that psychiatrists have not
been successful at predicting dangerous behavior.2 4 Most of these crit-
to others (e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1009(1) (1981)); others refer to "physical
harm" (e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1401(a) (Supp. 1981)); and several include non-
physical harm (e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 334-1 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 229.1(2)(b) (West Supp. 1982-83)). Dix, supra note 1, at 141 n.22.
20. Dix, supra note 1, at 142. The author contends that most statutes are either "si-
lent or useless concerning the required risk" of harm. Some statutes require a
"substantial risk." See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 2251(7) (1978); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020(3) (Supp. 1984). Others require a "reasonable expec-
tation that there is a substantial risk" of harm. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 28:2(3) (West 1985). Still others require a finding that the individual can "rea-
sonably be expected within the near future to intentionally or unintentionally
seriously physically injure himself or another." See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.800(401)(a), (b)(Callaghan 1980). Dix supports specific "quantification" in
drafting (i.e., 50 percent, 75 percent, etc.) to ascertain the predictive risk required.
Dix, supra note 1, at 142. For example, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-3(m) (1978), re-
quires an "apparently quantitative requirement that the occurrence of the re-
quired injury be 'more likely than not'." Dix, supra note 1, at 142 n.29. Morse
contends that although less vague criteria may "ensure greater fairness" in appli-
cation, the foundation of the system remains unsound because of the poor predic-
tive capabilities of "anyone." Morse, supra note 1, at 73-74.
21. Most state statutes continue to provide that psychiatrists or other mental health
professionals shall evaluate the patient and testify at hearings. See, e.g., WASH.
REV. CODE § 71.05.250 (1974) (allowing testimony of the physcian and waiver of
the physician-patient privilege at the probable cause hearing).
22. Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins
in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 694 (1974).
23. Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power in Civil Commitment A Knife That Cuts
Both Ways, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 1969, at 42. Albers, Pasewark, & Meyer,
supra note 6, suggest that courts and the legal profession have abdicated their
roles in civil commitment hearings by relying on fallible psychiatric testimony.
Id. at 30-33. The authors conclude that courts often permit psychiatrists to as-
sume the role of actual decisionmaker, rather than witness, by construing psychi-
atric testimony as conclusionary. Id at 30-31.
24. See generally J. ZISKIN, 1 COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTI-
[Vol. 64:215
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ics argue that psychiatrists also do not attain a significant level of
agreement among themselves in diagnosing mental illness of particu-
lar individuals.25 The empirical data on these two issues question the
efficacy of most state commitment schemes since they require findings
of both the existence of mental illness and a likelihood of future dan-
gerousness to self or others.2 6 The data also challenge the integrity of
commitment hearings because the primary evidence is a psychiatric
evaluation of an individual's propensity toward future violence and a
diagnosis of a specific mental illness.27
Most critics consider the greatest failure of psychiatrists to be the
unreliability of their testimony in the courtroom and their use of
vague labels to describe mental illness. 28 Those who object to the psy-
chiatric labels used in diagnoses cite numerous studies and research
documenting that psychiatrists rarely agree on which or how many
elements are needed to justify a particular label.29 Yet courts con-
tinue to permit and even encourage psychiatrists to offer opinions in
commitment hearings and to describe patients by using technical
terminology.3 0
Many commentators criticize the "extraordinary power" given to
psychiatrists in civil commitment proceedings based on the assump-
tion of expertise and the assumption that their diagnoses and conclu-
sions are reliable.31 Yet research demonstrates the general inability of
psychiatrists to diagnose individual patients consistently. According
to one popular commentator, the chance of one psychiatrist agreeing
MONY (3rd ed. 1981). See also Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 696; La Fond
supra note 8, at 511; Comment, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional
Requirement for Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111, 44 U. CHi. L.
REV. 562, 583 (1977).
25. See, e.g., Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 701. Mental health practitioners have
been criticized because of their inability to "define and categorize" specific
mental disabilities. Thus, under the medical model, any "deviant" behavior could
potentially be classified as a "disorder" thereby expanding the range of commit-
ment statutes. Morse, supra note 1, at 68, 69.
26. See Beis, supra note 4, at 358.
27. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 694-95. The authors note that psychia-
trists are urged to offer their opinions on the "ultimate issues" of both potential
dangerousness and existence of a mental disorder. Id at 694.
28. Shell, Psychiatric Testimony: Science or Fortune Telling?, 7 BARRISTER, Fall
1980, at 6. In general, reliability refers to the "probability or frequency of agree-
ment when two or more independent observers answer the same question ......
Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 697.
29. Shell, supra note 28, at 8. Common diagnostic labels often include "psychotic,"
"schizophrenic," "passive-agressive," "sociopathic," and "psychopathic". For a
thorough description of all diagnostic categories, see AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AS-
SOCIATION, DSM-III: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISoR-
DERS (3rd ed. 1980).
30. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 694.
31. 1d at 695.
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with the diagnosis of another is barely better than fifty-fifty.32 Two
other authors, summarizing a number of empirical studies, found
broad diagnostic categories (e.g., schizophrenia) more reliable than
specific sub-categories, but concluded that even in controlled condi-
tions, the reliability rates in both categories are unsatisfactory.3 3 They
found that psychiatric judgments were not only unreliable with re-
spect to the ultimate diagnosis, but that they also lacked consistency in
the "perception of the presence, nature, and severity of symptoms."3 4
The authors suggest that this low level of agreement will decrease fur-
ther when the clinical observations are made in actual psychiatric
practice, rather than under controlled experimental conditions.3 5
Comparatively few studies have assessed the validity or accuracy of
psychiatric diagnoses.6 Nevertheless, several researchers have deter-
mined that most specific diagnoses do not accurately describe actual
symptoms exhibited by a patient and that there is little correlation
between diagnoses and behavioral patterns.3 7 Other researchers stud-
ying diagnostic validity have found no significant difference in the ac-
curacy of those diagnostic predictions made by psychiatrists and those
made by lay persons.38 Further, since no connection has been estab-
lished between the actual presence of a mental illness and the likeli-
hood of violent behavior, critics argue that a finding of psychiatric
32. J. ZISKIN, supra note 24, at 126.
33. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 699-708 (citing Zubin, C7assification of the
Behavior Disorders, 18 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 373 (1967)).
34. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 706. In other words, diagnostic disagreements
cannot be totally explained by different diagnostic preferences. The authors con-
tend that some psychiatrists may actually see diverse or more severe symptoma-
tology in the same patient than other diagnosticians. Id at 706-07.
35. Id at 703. Note that controlled conditions in experimental settings generally re-
fer to those measures taken to ensure that variables other than the one under
investigation are not influencing the outcome. J. ZISKIN, supra note 24, at 73.
Variables that may produce less reliable results in actual practice include such
factors as inexperienced or incompetent psychiatrists, definitional ambiguities
and biases, and semantic differences. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 703.
36. Validity generally refers to the relationship of one fact or variable to another.
The most common use of validity is referred to as "predictive validity." In other
words, given certain knowledge concerning variable A, one can state with a
known degree of probability the likelihood of the occurrence or coexistence of
event B. J. ZISKIN, supra note 24, at 76-78. In more general terms, validity refers
to the actual accuracy of psychiatric judgments. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22,
at 697. In this context, the term refers to whether persons who have been diag-
nosed as mentally ill and determined to be dangerous pursuant to an involuntary
commitment statute will in fact commit a violent or dangerous act after the
prediction.
37. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 709-10. See also id. at 711 (citing Frank, Psy-
chiatric Diagnosis: A Review of Research, 81 J. GEN. PSYcHOL. 157, 164 (1969));
Wittenborn & Lesser, Biographical Factors and Psychiatric Symptoms, 7 J. CLIN.
PSYCHOL. 317 (1951).
38. Goldsmith & Mandell, The Dynamic Formulation: A Critique of a Psychiatric
Ritual, 125 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1738 (1969).
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disturbance provides little assistance in accurately predicting future
dangerousness.3 9
The debate over the value of psychiatric testimony has been even
more prevalent with respect to psychiatrists' ability to predict danger-
ousness. Most of the literature documents that dangerousness is over-
predicted and that psychiatrists tend to err on the side of caution.40
One commentator found that the highest rate of accurate predictions
of potential dangerousness has been only about 35 percent.41 Another
study demonstrated that even under controlled conditions, at least 60
to 70 percent of the individuals determined to be dangerous were, in
fact, harmless.42 A recent monograph, published by the National In-
stitute of Mental Health, reviewed the major research published in
the 1970's and contended that psychiatrists are more often wrong than
right in predicting dangerous behavior, especially over an extended
period of time.43 The monograph concluded that no psychiatric proce-
dures or techniques had succeeded in reducing the high rate of "false
positive" predictions; i.e., affirmative predictions of future dangerous
behavior that are subsequently proven erroneous.4 The author ob-
served that: "it would be fair to conclude that the 'best' clinical re-
search currently in existence indicates that psychiatrists and
psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of three predic-
tions of violent behavior over a several year period ....
These findings are consistent with the position adopted by the
American Psychiatric Association in a Task Force Report on clinical
aspects of violence. The Association issued a report claiming that "the
state of the art regarding predictions of violence is very unsatisfac-
tory" and that the ability of psychiatrists to reliably predict future vio-
39. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 716.
40. Chambers, Alternatives to Commitment, 70 M!cH. L. REv. 1107, 1120 (1972). See
also Comment, supra note 24, at 583-84. Often, psychiatrists over-predict danger-
ousness "to avoid a situation where a person diagnosed as not dangerous then
goes out into the community and commits an act of violence." Shell, supra note
28, at 8. Further, psychiatrists may over-predict violence out of fear of being re-
sponsible for the erroneous release of a violent individual. See J. MONAHAN, THE
CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 13, 22-25, 86 (1981).
41. Comment, supra note 24, at 583 (citing Kozol, Boucher, & Ganofali, The Diagno-
sis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 J. CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 371, 390
(1972)).
42. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 714. Note that proponents of psychiatric pre-
dictions suggest that the percentage of preventive detentions based on inaccurate
predictions is "a necessary and inevitable cost of protecting society from the large
number of truly dangerous individuals who are diagnosed accurately." See Shell,
supra note 28, at 8. Opponents argue conversely that the high number of wrongly
committed individuals cannot be justified "in a society that values liberty."
Morse, supra note 1, at 74.
43. J. MONAHAN, supra note 40.
44. 1I at 49.
45. Id at 47.
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lence remains unproved.46 The Task Force found that clinicians
should not regard prevention of future violence as within their capa-
bilities and that "'dangerousness' is neither a psychiatric nor a medi-
cal diagnosis," but rather involves issues of legal and social
judgment.47
Many commentators have relied on these empirical data to support
the claim that to permit involuntary deprivations of liberty based on
psychiatric testimony of dangerousness violates constitutional rights
of prospective patients. 48 As one author commented, the research doc-
uments that police power commitment authority based on psychiatric
predictions of dangerousness permits a state to confine individuals
who, in most instances, pose no danger to themselves or the commu-
nity.49 The author contends that this conclusion inevitably raises a
substantive due process issue since the state's purpose in committing
individuals, that of protecting the patient or the community, is not
promoted in most cases by the physical restraint.50
A proponent of the abolition of civil commitment concludes that
inaccurate psychiatric predictions "create a powerful objection to in-
voluntary commitment."51 He further claims that until predictive ac-
curacy is improved, the civil commitment system will continue to
produce an unacceptable number of wrongful detentions.52 He ulti-
mately proposes that "our duty to protect the liberty of all persons
must lead us to forego commitment in those few cases where many
persons might agree that it is warranted."53
46. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDI-
VIDUAL 30 (1974) [hereinafter cited as APA REPORT].
47. Id at 33. The Task Force's primary finding was that judgments concerning the
long-term potential for future violence and the "dangerousness" of a given indi-
vidual are "fundamentally of very low reliability." Id at 23. Note, however, that
the Association later distinguished predictions of short-term future behavior in
civil commitment cases as "clinically different from predictions of long-term dan-
gerousness." See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Am. Psychiatric Ass'n at 12, Bare-
foot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983) [hereinafter cited as APA Brief]. See infra
notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 743. These authors specifically con-
tend that depriving individuals of their right to liberty based on unreliable psy-
chiatric judgments violates both substantive and procedural due process. Id.
49. La Fond, supra note 8, at 511.
50. Id, at 511-12. Based on the empirical evidence demonstrating that psychiatric pre-
dictions are more often wrong than right, a strong argument can be made that the
state lacks a "compelling interest" to commit individuals upon evidence of a diag-
nosis of mental illness and of likelihood of future dangerous behavior. See supra
notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
51. Morse, supra note 1, at 75-76.
52. Id at 76.
53. Id. at 79. The author claims that for a variety of reasons, including the desire to
control deviance, difficulties in the proper definition and diagnosis of mental dis-
orders, vagueness of commitment standards, difficulties in accurately predicting
future behavior, and procedural laxity, the present commitment system will re-
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Despite the potential for erroneous detention, both federal and
state courts continue to sustain police power authority in involuntary
civil commitment proceedings.54 As a result, many legal commenta-
tors advocate that psychiatric evidence be eliminated or at least se-
verely circumscribed.55 In addition, some authors advocate that
coerced detention be permitted only upon a showing that an individual
committed a recent overt dangerous act.56
Predicating confinement on overt and demonstrable behavior
would establish state authority to detain an individual based on past
conduct rather than potential future behavior.57 Further, a history of
past violence tends to increase the probability that future violence will
occur.5 8 A growing body of empirical knowledge suggests that where
there are repetitive past acts of violence, predictions of future danger-
ous behavior become increasingly more reliable.59 Although not to-
tally satisfactory,6 0 proponents argue that evidence of recent
sult in a number of improper commitments and "will continue to function as an
unjust system." Id at 78. He argues further that the benefits of abolition will
increase liberty, reduce role confusion and the onerous tasks of mental health
professionals, enhance treatment, and will result in the freeing of wasted re-
sources. Id. at 93. But see Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization
Homelessness and Liberation Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 391, 403 (1980) ("doctors
have underestimated the seriousness of deprivation of liberty and the hazards of
psychiatric treatment, [but] opponents of all involuntary confinement may under-
estimate the suffering that can result from failure to treat. . . lawyers may have
over emphasized liberty").
54. LaFond, supra note 8, at 513-14.
55. See, eg., Matteson, Involuntary Civil Commitment. The Inadequacy of Existing
Procedural and Substantive Protections, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 906, 948 (1981). See
also J. ZISKIN, supra note 24, and infra note 64 and accompanying text.
56. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 750; La Fond, supra note 8, at 514. See
generally Comment, supra note 24.
57. La Fond, supra note 8, at 514. As one author contends, an overt dangerous behav-
ior standard may supply the state with a "threshold condition" for interference
with individual liberty by providing reinforcement and support to potential inac-
curate psychiatric predictions of dangerousness. Comment, supra note 24, at 592.
58. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 24, at 583. But cf. APA REPORT, supra note 46, at
23-31. Note that the Report indicated that for prediction purposes "severely re-
cidivistic offenders" might be considered at greater risk for repeated violence, but
the actual probability still remains slight. Id. at 28. The Task Force cautioned
further that it is "often forgotten that dangerousness is an attribute not only of
persons but of situations and environmental factors... and all must be attended
to when considering the 'dangerousness' of an individual." Id. at 25. These find-
ings support the need for more thorough evaluations of individuals before predic-
tions can be made (see infra note 156 and accompanying text regarding "clinical-
predictive" evaluations) and question any assumption that lay judgments, based
on statistical and actuarial data, provide any more sound results. See infra note
159.
59. J. MONAHAN, supra note 40, at 14-15.
60. See, e.g., Steadman & Cocozza, Psychiatry, Dangerousness and the Repetitively
Violent Offender, 69 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 226 (1978). In a study of
felony defendants adjudged incompetent, these researchers found that only ex-
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dangerous behavior will at least reduce the risk of error and limit psy-
chiatric evidence based totally on mere speculation.61
Because of the purported lack of psychiatric expertise in predicting
potential dangerousness and the lack of agreement as to diagnoses, the
question remains whether this kind of testimony should ever be ad-
mitted in police power civil commitment proceedings. Many critics
fear that the highly prejudicial impact of such testimony creates an
unacceptably high risk that a jury or court will be incapable of sepa-
rating "scientific myth from reality."62
Some commentators would thus limit all psychiatric evidence to
merely descriptive statements and exclude any testimony as to dan-
gerousness, opinions, or predictions.63 Another author suggests that
psychiatric evidence should not be permitted at all, and if admitted,
should be given little or no weight.64 The most ardent critics contend
that psychiatrists should never be allowed to testify as experts until
they can demonstrate through empirical data that their judgments are
both reliable and valid and that the evidence conveys useful informa-
tion to a judge or jury on the relevant issues in a civil commitment
proceeding.65
The general evidentiary theory underlying the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony assumes that experts in a particular field can draw in-
ferences from facts that a jury would not itself be competent to
draw.66 Court rules specifically permit expert opinion, even to the ul-
timate issue, when the subject is so distinctly related to a profession
"as to be beyond the ken of the average layman" and when the opin-
ions "will probably aid the trier in his search for truth."67
treme repetitiveness of violent arrests (i.e., 6 or more) might have any predictive
accuracy, and that the criterion employed to predict was that of the current al-
leged offense rather than any specific psychiatric standard. Id at 229-30.
61. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 750. But see Project Release v. Prevost, 551 F.
Supp. 1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). In this case the court held that due process was not
violated by the absence of a recent overt act. The court found that "an impartial
factfinder, guided by medical documentation, should be permitted to determine
that mental illness is present and danger likely without waiting for an individ-
ual's conduct to make serious physical harm all but inevitable." I& at 1305.
62. -Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3414 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See
also White v. Estelle, 554 F. Supp. 851 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Ennis & Litwack, supra
note 22, at 694. In White the court found when a prediction of future dangerous-
ness "is proffered by a witness bearing the title of 'Doctor,' its impact on the jury
is much greater than if it were not masquerading as something it is not." White v.
Estelle, 554 F. Supp. 851, 858 (S.D. Texas 1982).
63. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 742. See also Matteson, supra note 55, at 948
n.250 (noting that even behavioral descriptions may be biased).
64. J. ZISKIN, Supra note 24, at 1.
65. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 737-38, 742.
66. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 13, at 29 (2d. ed. 1972).
67. Id- at 29-30. See also Jenkins v. U.S., 307 F.2d 637, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Ennis and
Litwack note that, "at commitment hearings, psychiatrists are permitted and
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Some critics argue vehemently that psychiatric opinions, predic-
tions, and judgments as to future dangerousness are so unreliable that
they do not meet this general test of admiissibility.68 Two commenta-
tors contend that psychiatrists would not qualify as expert witnesses
if, like other experts, they were first required to prove their expertise
before courts permitted them to testify.6 9 Another author concludes
that the average layperson can make the kind of judgments that psy-
chiatrists provide in the courtroom and that, due to lack of certainty,
hard data, and potential for bias, such testimony cannot objectively aid
the trier-of-fact in its search for truth.7 0 These critics would therefore
not admit psychiatric expert testimony until empirical, objective data
prove its value.71
A recent decision in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
applied an even more stringent standard of admissibility, generally re-
served for scientific techniques and experiments.72 Based on the Frye
test,73 the court held that psychiatric predictions of future dangerous-
ness were inadmissible because such evidence had not gained general
acceptance in the field of psychiatry.74 The court's holding was specif-
ically predicated on the American Psychiatric Association's conclusion
that the unreliability of such psychiatric predictions is now an estab-
lished fact within the profession.75
even encouraged to offer their opinions on the ultimate issues-is the prospective
patient 'mentally ill,' or 'dangerous,' or 'in need of care and treatment'?" Ennis &
Litwack, supra note 22, at 694. See also FED. R. EVID. 704: "Testimony in the
form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissable is not objectionable because
it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier-of-fact."
68. See, e.g., J. ZIsKIN, supra note 24, at 1; Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 735.
69. Ennis & litwack, supra note 22, at 735. The authors compare court treatment of
psychiatric evidence to the strong judicial rejection of polygraph results, finding
that psychiatric evidence is far less reliable (though admissible) than polygraph
tests, which are generally not admissible as evidence. I& at 735-37. See infra
notes 128-38 & 174-76 and accompanying text.
70. J. ZISKIN, supra note 24, at 28, 37, 38.
71. I& at 1. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 737-38. These authors require objec-
tive rather than subjective validation as the "central premise of the scientific
method." Id- at 738 n.161.
72. In re William Wilson, Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Family Divi-
sion, Mental Health Branch, M.H. No. 1124-82 (Apr. 14, 1983).
73. Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See infra note 74.
74. In re William Wilson, Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Family Divi-
sion, Mental Health Branch, M.H. No. 1124-82 (Apr. 14, 1983). Note that the in-
terpretation of this criterion, as set forth in Frye, emphasized that:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. [W]hile
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which
the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
75. In re William Wilson, Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Family Divi-
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The above research presents considerable evidence to discredit
most of the psychiatric testimony offered in police power commitment
hearings. Arguably, these studies demonstrate that psychiatrists pos-
sess no special competence or expertise, thus raising serious doubt as
to whether such evidence should be considered admissible in commit-
ment proceedings under either the standard governing opinion evi-
dence or scientific evidence. As two critics asserted, "[ilt is
inconceivable that a judgment could be considered an 'expert' judg-
ment where it is less accurate than the flip of a coin." 6 Whether, the
Supreme Court will find the issue one of constitutional magnitude re-
mains unresolved.
IV. PREDICTING THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE
As mentioned previously, the United States Supreme Court has
never expressly considered the issue of whether psychiatric predic-
tions of future dangerousness should be admissible evidence in civil
commitment proceedings, nor has the Court ever expressly sustained
the constitutionality of police power commitments based on such pre-
dictive criteria. The Court has, however, upheld the use of psychiatric
evidence in other highly controversial and analogous situations. In ad-
dition, it has ruled on specific procedural issues in the civil commit-
ment process, thereby implicitly recognizing the underlying
substantive statutory requirements. 77
In 1956, the Court acknowledged the uncertainty of diagnoses and
the tentativeness of professional judgments in the field of psychiatry
in Greenwood v. United States.78 Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the
district court's holding that the particular defendant was incompetent
to stand trial and that, "if released, he would probably endanger the
officers, property, or other interests of the United States." 9 Although
two court-appointed psychiatrists testified that the defendant was
sane, the Supreme Court accepted the conclusion of the district court
that the defendant was incompetent, holding that denial of constitu-
tional power of Congress to commit ought not to rest on "dogmatic
sion, Mental Health Branch, M.H. No. 1124-82 (Apr. 14, 1983) (citing APA Brief,
supra note 47, at 12).
76. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 22, at 737. Note that even a flip of a coin yields
better odds than the 1 chance in 3 currently demonstrated by clinical research.
See J. MONAHAN, supra note 40, at 4749.
77. See La Fond, supra note 8, at 508. The author comments that by concluding that
procedural due process must be afforded in commitment proceedings, it can be
argued that courts have, in effect, legitimated the fundamental assumption un-
derlying commitment, i.e., that the state may detain a person either under the
police power or parens patriae authority.
78. 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956) (federal commitment statute for individual charged with a
federal crime construed as applying to temporary and not so temporary insanity).
79. I& at 375.
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adherence to one view or another on controversial psychiatric is-
sues."8 0 The Court, citing the unsettled and conflicting nature of psy-
chiatry, sustained the power of the district court to commit despite the
psychiatric testimony to the contrary.
In O'Connor v. Donaldson,8 1 the Court expressly refused to con-
sider "whether, when, or by what procedures" a state may justify in-
voluntary confinement. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
stated that "a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a
nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom
by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members
or friends."8 2 It has been suggested that this decision intimates that
the Court would sustain the constitutionality of police power commit-
ment of dangerous mentally ill individuals.83 More importantly, how-
ever, the Court accepted as conclusive the jury finding that, based on
"abundant evidence" including expert testimony, the petitioner posed
no danger to himself or others nor had he ever committed a dangerous
act.
8 4
The Supreme Court has also recently addressed procedural issues
in involuntary civil commitment. In Addington v. Texas,8 5 the Court
concluded that procedural due process must be afforded regardless of
the type of authority asserted by the state.8 6 The Court specifically
held that the fourteenth amendment applies in the civil commitment
process, and that the standard of proof in such hearings should be
"clear and convincing" evidence.8 7 Acknowledging the potential risk
80. Id. at 376. The Court explicitly upheld Congressional authority to involuntarily
commit individuals incompetent to stand trial because of mental illness pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-48. By affirming the district court's findings, which were
based upon psychiatric opinions, the Court implicitly sanctioned the use of psy-
chiatric expertise to determine presence of mental illness as well as potential
dangerousness.
81. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Petitioner had been committed to a Florida hospital for main-
tenance and custody for over 15 years. The Court found no justification for the
prolonged confinement, stating that mental illness alone does not, by itself, estab-
lish a sufficient state purpose to authorize custodial institutional care. The Court
did not decide whether the provision of treatment would have supplied a legiti-
mate constitutional basis for the confinement of non-dangerous individuals. Id. at
574-76.
82. Id. at 576.
83. See La Fond, supra note 8, at 514.
84. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 568 (1975).
85. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
86. Id. at 426.
87. Id. at 433. The Court specifically addressed the issue of the standard of proof that
is constitutionally required in state civil commitment proceedings. The two ques-
tions presented to the jury required a finding that the individual was mentally ill
and that he required hospitalization for his own welfare and protection or for the
protection of others. Id. at 421. The implications of the Addington decision indi-
cate that the Court will constitutionally require findings supported by "clear and
convincing evidence" on each issue. See id. at 429.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
of error resulting in wrongful confinement, the Court demanded
greater proof than a "mere preponderance" of the evidence as usually
required in civil proceedings.SS Also recognizing the "lack of cer-
tainty" and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnoses, the Court refused to
require the traditional criminal "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
The Court concluded that it is questionable whether a state could ever
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill
and dangerous.8 9
The Addington decision is important in two respects. First, Frank
O'Neal Addington was civilly committed for an indefinite period
under a Texas statute that authorized confinement when a proposed
patient was mentally ill and required hospitalization (1) for his own
welfare and protection, (2) for the protection of others, and (3) be-
cause he was mentally incompetent.9 0 Although the Court specifically
addressed only the appropriate standard of proof, in dicta it acknowl-
edged that a state has authority under the police power to protect the
community and an individual who poses a danger to himself or
others.91 As one commentator suggests, it can be argued that by con-
cluding that procedural due process must be afforded individuals
whom the state seeks to commit under its police power, the Court has
in effect legitimated the fundamental purpose of such commitment.92
Therefore, the Court at least tacitly approved the state's police power
authority to involuntarily detain mentally ill individuals who are a
threat to themselves or others.
Second, the Addington Court recognized specifically that the
state's evidence included the testimony of two psychiatrists "who qual-
ified as experts" and who testified as to the appellant's mental state.93
These experts also expressed medical opinions that the appellant was
"probably dangerous both to himself and to others."94 The Supreme
Court of Texas had already concluded that these particular substan-
tive issues must be answered by competent medical or psychiatric tes-
timony.95 Although disagreeing with the Texas court's holding
88. Id at 427.
89. 1I at 429.
90. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-51 (Vernon 1958). The Texas formula has
since been amended to allow confinement either if the person is mentally ill and
dangerous, or if the person is unable to function independently and unable to
make a rational choice as to whether to submit to treatment. TEX. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art 5547-51 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
91. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
92. See La Fond, supra note 8, at 508.
93. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 420-21 (1979).
94. Id- at 421.
95. See State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex. 1977). Note that the court's deci-
sion in State v. Addington, 557 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. 1977), was based on this compan-
ion decision.
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regarding the standard of proof,9 6 the Court agreed that "whether the
individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either himself or others and
is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of facts which
must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists."9 7 This
assertion influenced the Court's holding that clear and convincing evi-
dence is sufficient in civil commitment proceedings since it is difficult
for expert physicians to offer definite conclusions and because the
traditional medical standard for fact finding is a "reasonable medical
certainty."98
The findings of the Court in Addington were reaffirmed recently
in the highly controversial case of Parham v. J.R.99 Delineating con-
stitutionally minimum procedures for voluntary commitment of
juveniles by parents, the Court held that due process does not require
a formal or quasi-formal hearing prior to initial commitment.o00 The
Court, in balancing the interests of the state, child, and parents, held
that a medical investigation by a neutral factfinder was sufficient to
prevent the risk of arbitrary and erroneous admission decisions.O1
The Court noted expressly that "neither judges nor administrative
hearing officers are better qualified than psychiatrists to render psy-
chiatric judgments."i 02 Citing both Addington and Donaldson, the
96. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979) (the Texas Supreme Court required
the state to prove the statutory requisites to commitment by a preponderence of
the evidence).
97. Id. at 429.
98. Id. at 430.
99. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
100. Id. at 607. In Addington, the Court held explicitly that adults subject to involun-
tary commitment proceedings are entitled to due process protections as required
by the fourteenth amendment. Thus, the state must establish the substantive
criteria for commitment (e.g., mental illness and dangerousness) in a hearing by
proof that is "clear and convincing." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
Note that the Parham decision represents a case involving a parent's presumed
interest in providing for the welfare of the child. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
602-603 (1979). Finding that state officials and federal courts are not equipped to
review parental authority or decisions as to the child's best interest, the Court
held explicitly that psychiatric or medical review was an acceptable check on pa-
rental discretion to commit a child to a state hospital for care and treatment. Id.
at 604-07.
101. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979). Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
majority, noted that states are free to require a full hearing before commitment
of a child, but cautioned that admission procedures should be flexible enough so
as not to unduly burden the state nor inhibit parental decisions to seek help for a
child. Id. He also reiterated the Court's assertion that due process is a "flexible"
concept that requires only those "procedural protections as the particular situa-
tion demands." Id. at 608 n.16 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972)). Finally, he stressed that due process has never required that a neutral or
detached factfinder be a legally trained judge or administrative officer. Parham
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489
(1972), and Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970)).
102. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979). The Court concluded further that at
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Parham Court rejected the notion that the particular shortcoming of
medical specialists can always be avoided by shifting decisions from
trained professionals to untrained judges or hearing officers.1 03 This
decision reflects the Court's acceptance of psychiatric judgments and
opinions in juvenile commitment proceedings, even without the pur-
ported protections of judicial review.104
Finally, the very recent case of Barefoot v. Estelle,10 5 presents the
most compelling evidence to postulate that the Supreme Court will
permit psychiatric opinions on diagnoses and predictions of future
dangerousness in civil commitment proceedings. Thomas Barefoot
was convicted of capital murder in Texas. In the subsequent separate
sentencing phase of the trial, Barefoot was sentenced to death. One of
the particular questions answered affirmatively by the jury was that
there was a probability that the defendant would constitute a contin-
ued threat to society.1 06 The state introduced evidence of the defend-
ant's prior convictions and reputation for lawlessness, and called two
psychiatrists to testify against Barefoot. 07 Both of these psychiatrists,
responding to a hypothetical question phrased in terms of the defend-
ant's own conduct, testified that Barefoot would probably commit fu-
ture acts of violence and would therefore represent a continuing
times the judicial model for factfinding could "turn rational decisionmaking into
an unmanageable enterprise." Id. at 608 n.16.
103. Id. at 609. In his opinion, Chief Justice Burger contended that an adversarial
model would require an untrained and nonspecialist factfinder to render a "medi-
cal-psychiatric" decision. He also noted that such adversary proceedings are often
"more illusory than real," and thus do not in reality afford the protections sup-
posedly available in the legal process. 1d. In a sense, the Court seems to have
recognized that mistaken commitment may occur. It concluded that "risks of er-
ror in the process affords no rational predicate for holding unconstitutional an
entire statutory and administrative scheme that is generally followed in more
than 30 states." Id at 612.
104. Note that the substantive criteria in this juvenile commitment case did not re-
quire a finding of "dangerousness." The Georgia statute provided for commit-
ment of a juvenile, upon application by the parent, when the child demonstrated
evidence.of mental illness and therefore would be suitable for treatment. GA.
CODE § 88-503.1 (1975). Arguably, the Court could have required more substan-
tial due process protections if the state had attempted, as in Addington, to exer-
cise its police power authority to commit by finding the juvenile mentally ill and
dangerous to self or others. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979). It is
highly unlikely, however, that the Court would reject psychiatric testimony as to
the juvenile's potential dangerousness. In Addington, the Court specifically
noted that proof of dangerousness turns on psychiatric expert opinions and judg-
ments. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
105. 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983).
106. Id. at 3390. See also TEX. CODE CRiM. PROc. ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1981).
It should be noted that the jury was not asked to determine whether Barefoot
was mentally ill, as is universally required in involuntary civil commitment pro-
ceedings. See Beis, supra note 4.
107. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3389 (1983).
[Vol. 64:215
1985] CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS
threat to society.108
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Barefoot argued
that his death sentence should be set aside.10 9 He claimed that the
Constitution barred the psychiatric testimony presented during the
punishment phase of his trial.110 More specifically, he contended that
psychiatrists are not qualified or competent as a group to predict with
an acceptable degree of reliability that an individual presents a likeli-
hood of future dangerousness.ll Even if they were, he claimed they
could not testify without having actually examined him and, there-
fore, the use of the hypothetical question violated his rights to due
process of law.112
In a six-three decision, the United States Supreme Court rejected
all of Barefoot's arguments.1" 3 Recognizing first the constitutionality
of the substantive criterion of future dangerousness to impose the
death penalty,114 the Court emphatically upheld the use of psychiatric
108. Id. The hypothetical question presented by the prosecution to the two psychiatric
witnesses included a description of defendant's criminal record and catalogued
his past antisocial behavior. In particular, it asked the psychiatrists to assume, as
true, that: (1) the defendant had been convicted of five non-violent criminal of-
fenses and had been arrested and charged on several accounts of sexual offenses
involving children; (2) the defendant had a bad reputation in each of the eight
communities he had resided in the previous ten years; (3) the defendant was un-
employed during the two months preceding the murder, spent his time using
drugs, and boasted of plans to commit numerous crimes; (4) the defendant had
murdered the police officer as charged without provocation; and (5) the defend-
ant was observed as unperturbed subsequent to the murder by "a homosexual
witness." See APA Brief, supra note 47, at 4-5.
109. The Barefoot case also presented a major procedural issue regarding the Court of
Appeals' denial of a stay of execution pending appeal on a habeas corpus judg-
ment, since the court did not formally affirm the district court's judgment, but
did rule on the merits of the appeal. Barefoot specifically challenged this sum-
mary procedure. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3391 (1983). This argument
will not be addressed or presented in this article.
110. Id- at 3395.
111. I&
112. I& at 3395, 3396.
113. I& at 3406. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dis-
sented. Justice Marshall also wrote a separate dissenting opinion on the proce-
dural issue. See supra note 109.
114. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The Texas capital sentencing procedure
required the jury to answer the following three questions in a subsequent sen-
tencing hearing: (1) "Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the
death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expec-
tation that the death of the deceased or another would result"; (2) "Whether
there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society"; and (3) "If raised by the
evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was un-
reasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased." TEX. CODE
CR1m. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1975-76). In Jurek, the Court held
that although the Texas statute does not explicitly speak of mitigating circum-
stances, (see, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)), it did not violate the 8th
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testimony on the issue.115 In his opinion for the Court, Justice White
stated that defendant's argument against permitting psychiatric pre-
dictions of dangerousness was "somewhat like asking us to disinvent
the wheel."1 16 Moreover, he noted the variety of occasions in the
criminal process, such as determinations on bail, probation, parole,
and sentencing, in which future predictions of dangerousness are re-
quired.ll7 Citing Donaldson and Addington, Justice White concluded
that Barefoot's position that psychiatric evidence was too unreliable to
be admissible as evidence would call into question other contexts in
which similiar predictions of dangerousness must be made.118
In upholding the admissibility of psychiatric predictions of danger-
ousness, the Barefoot Court expressly reasoned that both federal and
state rules of evidence intend that relevant, unprivileged evidence be
admissible and its weight left to the factfinder.119 The Court further
noted that any lack of reliability should be called to the attention of
the jury and should be subject to rigorous cross-examination. 2 0 The
majority refused to share the dissent's "low evaluation" of the adver-
sary system and contended that this process could be trusted to ferret
and 14th amendments because the second question, that of whether the defend-
ant would constitute a continued threat to society, had been interpreted to allow a
defendant to present any mitigating circumstances. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
271-73, 276 (1976).
115. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3396 (1983).
116. 1d.
117. Id. at 3396. The Court observed that predicting future criminal conduct plays a
predominant role in the criminal justice system. On a daily basis, judges or other
officials are called upon to assess the probable future conduct of criminal defend-
ants. Id. (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976)).
In a very recent case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
New York preventive detention statute for juveniles. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct.
2403 (1984). This statute authorizes a judge to detain a juvenile before a probable
cause and factfinding hearing upon a finding that there is a "serious risk" that the
juvenile "may before the return date commit an act which if committed by an
adult would constitute a crime." N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT § 320.5(3)(b) (1983). Again,
the Court rejected the contention that it is so impossible to predict future behav-
ior that the statute must be constitutionally infirm, even without specific "codi-
fied" factors to guide the decisionmaker. Although no psychiatric testimony is
mandated, the judge or hearing officer is free to consider a number of variables
including nature and seriousness of-the crime, sufficiency of the charges, home
supervision, school supervision, and any special circumstances that may be
brought to the attention of the court.
118. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3396 (1983). Note that the Court specifically
referred to civil commitment proceedings and again, quoting Addington, reiter-
ated that "[w]hether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either himself
or others. . . turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by
expert psychiatrists and pscyhologists." Id. at 3397 (citing Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979)).
119. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3396 (1983). See also FED. R. EVID. 702-06.
120. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3397 n.7 (1983).
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out reliable from unreliable testimony, judgments, and opinions. 12 1
Likewise, the Court approved the use of hypothetical questions, per-
ceiving no constitutional barrier to applying ordinary rules of evidence
to govern the use of expert testimony.122 The fact that the experts
had not examined the defendant should go to the weight of their testi-
mony and not to its admissibility.123
A vigorous dissent in Barefoot, based in large part on the American
Psychiatric Association Brief as Amicus Curiae, relied on studies dem-
onstrating the unreliability of long-term psychiatric predictions of
dangerousness to reject the majority decision.' 2 4 The dissent and the
amicus curiae brief agreed that such testimony inherently violated
due process and created an intolerable risk that the death penalty
could be erroneously imposed.125
Both the dissent and the American Psychiatric Association agreed
that short-term predictions are more reliable than long-term predic-
tions; however, they argued vehemently that permitting psychiatric
evidence on the issue of future dangerousness gives rise to an issue of
constitutional dimension in capital cases.12 6 Further, based on the As-
sociation's contention that psychiatrists have no expertise in predict-
121. Id The Court also acknowledged that Barefoot did not present any contrary ex-
pert testimony in his own defense at trial, even though in cases of indigency,
Texas law provides for payment of $500 for "expenses incurred for purposes of
investigation and expert testimony." Id at 3397 n.5; TEx. CODE CRIm. PROC. ANN.
art. 26.05(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
122. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3399 (1983). See also R. RAY, TExAs EVIDENCE
§ 1402 (2d ed. 1956).
123. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3399 (1983) (citing the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals in Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d 875, 887 (1980)). The defendant ar-
gued vigorously that even if the Court did allow psychiatric evidence on the issue
of dangerousness, then such testimony must at least be based on a personal exam-
ination. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3399 (1983). The American Psychiat-
ric Association (as amicus curiae) supported this argument, claiming that
psychiatrists cannot render a medical opinion or diagnose an individual with any
reasonable degree of certainty without first performing an "in-depth psychiatric
examination." APA Brief, supra note 47, at 9.
In upholding the use of a hypothetical question to determine potential danger-
ousness, the Court observed that opinions based on hypothetical questions are
"commonly admitted as evidence." Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3399
(1983). The Court noted further that defendant could have presented his own
hypothetical question to the same witnesses during the trial, based on his own
version of the facts. IAl at 3400 n.10.
124. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3406 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See
generally APA Brief, supra note 47.
125. Barefoot v. Estelle 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3410 n.6 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
APA Brief, supra note 47, at 11. The American Psychiatric Association observed
further that the prejudicial impact of psychiatric testimony outweighs its proba-
tive value and that psychiatric predictions of dangerousness "characterized as
'medical opinions,' serve only to distort the factfinding process." Id
126. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3416 n.14, 3411-17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See generally APA Brief, supra note 47, at 11-12.
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ing long-term future dangerousness, the dissent likened such
testimony to scientific evidence and argued that it should be inadmissi-
ble.1 27 Although not specifically referring to the Frye test,128 the dis-
sent cited hornbook law that has generally been interpreted by Frye,
and which states that: "Opinion evidence is not admissible if the court
believes that the state of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge does
not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted."129 Thus, fearing prej-
udicial impact on the jury and concluding that psychiatric testimony is
less reliable than other traditionally excluded scientific evidence, the
dissent admonished the majority for merely labeling the rules as evi-
dentiary without addressing the constitutional impact.13 0 The dissent
cited authority documenting both judicial and attorney deference to
psychiatric testimony, and their lack of skill or expertise in presenting
or cross-examining psychiatric expert witnesses to reject the major-
ity's unrestricted admission of such evidence.131
The Court's opinion and reasoning in the recent Barefoot deci-
sion 3 2 suggest strongly that the Court will permit psychiatric predic-
tions of dangerousness to be used as evidence and will sustain state
authority to involuntarily commit persons based on substantive crite-
ria requiring an explicit finding of dangerousness. As indicated previ-
ously, the Barefoot case permitted the use of psychiatric evidence in
capital sentencing procedure. Since the re-establishment of the death
penalty, the Supreme Court has required sentencing procedures
amounting to a kind of "super due process."'133 In essence, the Court
127. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3411 n.8, 3413-14 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). The dissent contends that the majority ignored well-established constitu-
tional doctrines by cloaking them in a mantle of evidentiary rules. It
emphatically stated that due process is violated when unreliable "scientific" testi-
mony creates an imminent danger of an erroneous verdict that cannot be cor-
rected by the adversary process. Id. at n.10.
128. Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See supra notes 72-74.
129. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3413 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting C. McCoRMICK, supra note 66, § 13). See also In re William Wilson, Su-
perior Court of the District of Columbia, Family Division, Mental Health Branch,
M.H. No. 1124-82 at 4 (Apr. 14, 1983). The court here specifically applies the Frye
test to determine when the scientific community cannot be permitted to render a
reasonable opinion, i.e., if it has not been generally accepted in the particular
field in which it belongs. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See
Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3413 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 66, 31). See also id. (citing Ennis & Litwack, supra
note 22, at 736, referring specifically to the inadmissibility of polygraph evidence).
130. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3414 n.10 (1983).
131. Id. at 3414-15.
132. Id. at 3383.
133. See Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980). See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Generally, the Court has required that the judge or jury consider any mitigating
circumstances and to specifically find statutorily delineated aggravating circum-
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requires open and far-ranging arguments that place as much informa-
tion as possible before the jury.13 4 The jury then receives the evidence
and ultimately decides whether the defendant should be sentenced to
death. 3 5 Since the individual interest at stake in such proceedings-
life or death-is so significant, only reliable and relevant testimony
should be presented to the decisionmaker. The Supreme Court up-
held, however, the use of psychiatric predictions of dangerousness,
even based on hypothetical questions in death penalty proceedings.' 3 6
Although the majority did not address the Frye test, it applied tradi-
tional evidentiary rules for admissibility of psychiatric testimony, sug-
gesting that Frye does not rise to a constitutional rule.37 In effect,
psychiatric testimony may therefore be presented to a court or jury
and its reliability tested by the adversarial process even in capital
cases.
Given the civil nature of involuntary commitment proceedings and
the less serious deprivation of liberty involved, the Court surely will
permit psychiatric predictions of dangerousness as admissible evi-
dence when faced with the issue. Even the dissent and the American
Psychiatric Association in Barefoot distinguished the use of short-term
predictions for emergency commitment or treatment and in other con-
texts where the individual will not be criminally convicted or put to
death.13S Based on Barefoot, the Court is therefore likely to uphold
psychiatric predictions of dangerousness even in indeterminate civil
commitment proceedings.
The cases presented suggest that the Supreme Court, although ac-
knowledging the deficiencies of psychiatric opinions, will not be per-
suaded that such evidence is so unreliable or incompetent that it
would erect a constitutional bar to psychiatric testimony in the court-
room. Applying traditional rules of evidence, the Court apparently
views psychiatrists as "experts" whose opinions and judgments are
relevant in many types of proceedings. 3 9 Moreover, any professional
doubts or shortcoming as to the reliability of the testimony should not
question the admissibility of such evidence, but rather should be ex-
posed to the trier-of-fact through the traditional adversary process.140
It also appears that the Court will validate police power civil com-
stances to prevent untrammeled discretion or an arbitrarily imposed death sen-
tence. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976).
134. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04 (1976).
135. I&
136. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983).
137. But see supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
138. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3416 n.14 (1983); APA Brief, supra note 47, at
11-12.
139. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3397-98 (1983).
140. Id
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mitment based on a "dangerousness" criterion.141 Because of its ac-
ceptance of psychiatric judgments and opinions, it is likely that the
Court will permit such "expert" testimony to establish an individual's
propensities toward future violence. Despite the criticism of psychiat-
ric testimony, the Court has maintained that civil commitment pro-
ceedings turn on medical decisions and therefore necessitate the use of
psychiatric evidence to establish the substantive criteria of both
mental illness and potential dangerousness.142
V. PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT TESTIMONY SHOULD BE
ADMISSIBLE IN CIVIL COMMITMENT
PROCEEDINGS
Psychiatrists and other mental health professionals have tradition-
ally played an active role in both civil and criminal proceedings when-
ever a particular legal issue involved a determination of a "mental" or
"emotional" element.143 In involuntary commitment hearings, psychi-
atrists have consistently been the primary witnesses to render expert
opinions on the relevant substantive criteria. Despite the repeated
challenges by many legal theorists claiming that psychiatric expert
predictions of dangerousness are grossly inaccurate, most state com-
mitment statutes continue to mandate the use of such evidence in both
indeterminate and short-term commitment proceedings.1 4 4
Many critics of the use of psychiatric expertise to predict future
violence have drawn sweeping generalizations from existing research
to repudiate the use of guch evidence in all legal proceedings.145 A
141. See supra notes 77 & 91.
142. See supra note 103.
143. Needell, Psychiatric Expert Wintesses: Proposals for Change, 6 AM. J. OF L. AND
MED. 425, 425-27 (1980-81).
144. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05, § 71.05.240 & § 71.05.250 (1975). At the conclu-
sion of the probable cause hearing, an individual may be detained for involuntary
treatment not to exceed 14 days if the court finds by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the person "presents a likelihood of serious harm to others or himself
. " i at 71.05.240 to 250. The physician-patient privilege shall be deemed
waived in these proceedings to permit the introduction of relevant and competent
medical records or testimony of an evaluation or treatment facility or its staff.
See also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 5547, §§ 40-57 (Vernon 1958). For indefi-
nite commitment, the proposed patient must be (1) mentally ill, (2) in need of
hospitalization for his own welfare and protection or for the protection of others,
and (3) mentally incompetent. These issues must be determined by competent
medical or psychiatric testimony. State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex. 1977).
145. See, e.g., J. ZISKIN, supra note 24, at. 1. Ziskin comments that "[dlespite the ever
increasing utilization of psychiatric and psychological evidence in the legal pro-
cess such evidence frequently does not meet reasonable criteria of admissibility
and should not be admitted in a court of law .... Id See also Ennis & Litwack,
supra note 22, at 696. These authors, referring specifically to civil commitment
proceedings, concluded that
(a) there is no evidence warranting the assumption that psychiatrists can
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number of recent studies, however, suggest that complete refutation
may be premature and that the research on the predictive ability of
psychiatrists does not support the unqualified conclusion that predic-
tions of violence are impossible14 6 Experts are now beginning to dis-
tinguish between long-term predictions of future dangerousness and
short-term clinical predictions for the purpose of emergency confine-
ment and treatment.147
One recent critique of past research suggests that the methodologi-
cal context used in major studies to demonstrate the failure of psychi-
atrists to predict accurately future violent conduct cannot reasonably
adduce similar conclusions with respect to short-term emergency com-
mitments.148 Most research has tested diagnoses made in an institu-
tional setting to predict violence that might occur in the open
community.149 In other words, institutionalized individuals were pre-
dicted to be violent if released into society, despite an "enormous body
of research" that indicates the extremely low correlation between be-
accurately determine who is 'dangerous'; (b) there is little or no evidence
that psychiatrists are more 'expert' in making the predictions relevant to
civil commitment than laymen; (c) 'expert' judgments made by psychia-
trists are not sufficiently reliable and valid to justify nonjudicial hospi-
talization based on such judgments; (d) the constitutional rights of
individuals are seriously prejudiced by the admissibility of psychiatric
terminology, diagnoses, and predictions, especially those of 'dangerous'
behavior; and therefore (e) courts should limit testimony by psychia-
trists to descriptive statements and should exclude psychiatric diagnoses,
judgments, and predictions.
Id.
146. Monahan, Prediction Research and the Emergency Commitment of Dangerous
Mentally Ill Persons: A Reconsideration, 135 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 198 (1978). See
also Cohen, Groth & Siegel, The Clinical Prediction of Dangerousness, 24 CRIME
AND DELiNQ. 28 (1978).
147. See, e.g., Monahan, supra note 146, at 198-200. Generally, short-term predictions
for emergency commitment refer to those made when a mentally ill individual is
brought to the attention of a mental health professional for a determination of
whether mental illness is present and whether the individual will commit a vio-
lent act in the immediate future. A positive diagnosis of mental illness and a
prediction of likelihood of future harm would therefore result in short-term
emergency hospitalization. Id. at 200. Conversely, long-term predictions often
refer to assessment of the likelihood that an individual will engage in violent acts
some time in the future; the assessment is often made in an institutional setting
prior to considering the desirablility of release into the community. Long-term
predictions have been used to establish the likelihood of recidivism of prisoners,
as well as to predict potential future violence of mentally ill patients who have
been institutionalized for lengthy periods of time. Id.
148. Id. The author admits that his hypothesis is merely theoretical, although based
on the qualitative differences between long-term and short-term predictions. He
further suggests that scientific proof may never be available given the ethical con-
siderations of refusing intervention in a random half of the cases in which an
individual has been diagnosed mentally ill and predicted to engage in imminently
violent bahavior. Id. at 201.
149. Id at 199.
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havior predicted in one context and that observed in another.150 In
general, the author noted that institutional performance has little or
no effect on non-institutional (community) behavior and that the cor-
relation decreases as substantial periods of time intervene between
the point when the prediction is made and the point at which valida-
tion is undertaken in the community upon release.151
In the emergency setting, however, the context of prediction is the
same as the context of validation. 152 A prediction of a mentally ill
individual's propensity toward violence in the community is being
made by a mental health expert in the same community.153 Moreover,
the time period between prediction and validation is usually short; the
prediction frequently is that the person will be violent in a matter of
minutes or hours.154 The information available to the predictor is
fresh and based on the knowledge of the individual's environment and
diagnostic condition and, therefore, should be substantially more relia-
ble than the data reported on long-term institutionalized patients or
prisoners. 55
150. Id. Generally, the institutionalized group predicted to be violent if released was
in fact released by virtue of judicial order or parole board action, thus creating a
"natural experiment." The group was then monitored for a number of years to
assess the actual validity of the prediction. Low frequencies of violent behavior
were recorded, thereby demonstrating the inaccuracy of these institutional pre-
dictions. I&
151. Id. The author observes that this "gap" in time exists in current research on
predicting violent behavior. Further, the jails, prisons, and mental hospitals in
which the predictions are made differ from "open community situations that are
the truest test of predictive validity." Substantial time periods also intervene be-
tween the point when the institutional prediction is made and the community
validation is undertaken and/or between the most recent exposure to the commu-
nity context in which the prediction will be validated and the point at which the
institutional prediction is made. The author contends that in the former case too
much opportunity exists for the individual or the environment to change in un-
known ways before the prediction can be tested. In the latter case, the informa-
tion on how the person behaves in the open community is obscured by the
unknown changes that have occurred since institutionalization. Id-
152. Id- at 200. In other words, a prediction is being made in the open community tht
the person will be violent in the open community, i.e., the same context
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id- Since the prediction is being made in the same context in which it will be
validated, little intervening time occurs between the most recent exposure to the
context of validation and the point of prediction. In other words, the prediction is
made almost immediately after observing how the individual behaves in the con-
text (i.e., the community) in which the prediction will be validated. The author
comments that any prolonged period of hospitalization may have a significant ef-
fect on the individual or the environmental context and may thus produce the
predictive inaccuracies currently demonstrated by the available research. Id- at
201. Accordingly, while psychiatric diagnoses of mental illness and predictions of
dangerousness may be sufficiently reliable for emergency short-term confine-
ment decisions, the accuracy of indeterminate (long-term) commitment determi-
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Other commentators suggest that predictions based on diverse and
precise clinical behavior and social data may produce sound results
and achieve a significantly higher level of accuracy than traditional
statistical measures.156 The clinician typically examines an individ-
ual's emotional, behavioral, and psychological development through
detailed social, medical, and psychological records over a minimum pe-
riod of time before making predictive decisions.157 Such studies, per-
formed within the institution, can be utilized as further support or
rejection of the initial "emergency" prediction. The type of data gen-
erated from such a "clinical-predictive" approach would enhance the
accuracy of predictions that are required for longer periods of hospi-
talization, which are currently made merely on the basis of post-insti-
tutional conduct or the past dangerous act that led initially to
commitment, and which have traditionally demonstrated low
reliability.-58
The American Psychiatric Association, supporting the empirical
data that psychiatrists cannot and should not predict potential long-
term dangerous behavior,159 recently recognized that psychiatrists are
often expected to make such predictions about short-term prognoses,
nations remains questionable. But see infra note 163, where the American
Psychiatric Association apparently finds acceptable psychiatric opinions and judg-
ments in all civil commitment proceedings because of "close monitoring," "fre-
quent followup," and the ability to modify treatment recommendations and
dispositions.
156. Cohen, Groth, & Siegel, supra note 146, at 28. Although this approach has been
limited to offenders who have committed at least one dangerous act, the implica-
tion for civilly committed individuals appears quite noteworthy. Many critics of
the use of psychiatric predictions contend that the highest rate of "false positives"
is achieved when psychiatrists attempt long-term predictions over an extended
period of time such as in criminal sentencing. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S.
Ct. 3383, 3416 n.14 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). These critics argue that such
long-term predictions should therefore be based on traditional statistical and ac-
tuarial data. APA Brief, supra note 47, at 14. Assuming that "clinical-predictive"
studies achieve even greater accuracy in offender populations than statistical or
actuarial measures, the results should be even greater with mentally ill popula-
tions who have been hospitalized based on "emergency" predictions or a recent
overt act. Given adequate resources, these individuals can be assessed more thor-
oughly to detemrine the continued likelihood of potential harm to self or others.
See also Steadman & Cocozza, supra note 60, at 229-30 (finding that only extreme
repetitive acts of violence (i.e., six or more) had any predictive accuracy based
merely on the criterion of the alleged offense).
157. Cohen, Groth, & Siegel, supra note 146, at 30-31.
158. See supra note 156. See also Monahan, supra note 146, at 199 (discussing the low
reliability of mere institutional conduct as a basis to predict future behavior in a
non-institutional setting). "Clinical-predictive" studies include vast arrays of in-
formation, make use of a variety of professional personnel, and include environ-
mental, behavioral, and historical data to predict dangerousness as well as non-
dangerousness.
159. APA Brief, supra note 47, at 12. The Association observed that a long-term pre-
diction "is an essentially lay determination that should be based not on the diag-
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including predictions of dangerousness, in civil commitment proceed-
ings.160 It concluded that:
Such situations, however, are clinically different from predictions of long-
term dangerousness because they are made in the context of specific and usu-
ally acute mental illness (for example, severe depression), and they are made
with knowledge of the individual's short-term environmental situation, which
may have a direct bearing on the likelihood that he will act dangerously. 16 1
Thus, for civil commitment purposes, psychiatrists can evaluate the
patient's environmental situation and present mental condition to de-
termine their potential effect on behavioral patterns, including the
likelihood of violence in the near future.162 Further, the civil commit-
ment process generally requires close professional monitoring and fre-
quent follow-up, and therefore mandates modification of treatment
recommendations and dispositions for violent persons to reduce the
potential risk of error.163
Criticism of psychiatric predictions has led to the extreme hypoth-
noses and opinions of medical experts, but on the basis of predictive statistical or
actuarial information that is fundamentally non-medical in nature." Id at 14.
160. Id at 12 n.7.
161. I& Note that the American Psychiatric Association apparently views all civil
commitment proceedings, including indeterminate commitments, as distinguish-
able from those situations such as sentencing procedures which require long-term
predictions of potential future violence. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct.
3383 (1983). In its brief in Barefoot, the Association agreed with the current liter-
ature that psychiatrists are unable to make reliable predictions of long-term fu-
ture violent behavior to aid in sentencing decisions of criminal defendants. APA
Brief, supra note 47, at 12. Further, the Association emphatically concluded that
recurrent criminal behavior does not necessarily correlate with psychiatric disor-
ders or mental illness and, therefore, that predictions in these instances must
consider non-medical factors and must involve lay determinations rather than
medical diagnoses or opinions. Id at 14-15. On the other hand, the Association
recognized that psychiatrists will often be involved in evaluating both mental ill-
ness and potential dangerousness in civil commitment proceedings. The Associa-
tion observed that civil commitment decisions are distinguishably different from
long-term predictions of dangerousness because of the diagnoses of a "specific"
mental illness and its likely effect on individual behavior, id. at 12 n.7 (citing
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (a case that involved an application for
indeterminate commitment)), and because the civil commitment process presum-
ably includes treatment, follow-up, and the ability to correct erroneous decisons.
See Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3416 n.14, (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing); APA REPORT, supra note 46, at 30.
162. APA Brief, supra note 47, at 12 n.7.
163. APA REPORT, supra note 46, at 30. See also Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383,
3416 n.14 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Distinguishing civil commitment pro-
ceedings from criminal sentencing decisions, the dissent noted the more serious
consequences associated with erroneous decisions in the latter case. A predictive
error in a civil commitment hearing would not result in a criminal conviction,
much less invoke the death penalty in a capital case such as occurred in Barefoot.
Moreover, in a capital case, there is no chance for "followup" or "monitoring" and
any "subsequent change of mind brings not justice delayed, but the despair of
irreversible error." Id
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esis that lay persons or non-clinicians can make commitment evalua-
tions as well as, or better than, psychiatrists.164 This hypothesis is
challenged, however, by a recent experiment that examined 200 adult
psychiatric patients involuntarily committed to a state mental hospital
to assess the adequacy of evaluations performed by psychiatrists and
non-psychiatric personnel.165 The results indicated that psychiatrists
did in fact provide more adequate evidence for the necessary criteria
for civil commitment, particularly in diagnosing mental illness, than
did the non-psychiatric physicians.166 Of more importance, the data
documented clearly that both psychiatrists and medical physicians
provided significantly more adequate evidence of both mental illness
and potential dangerousness than did law enforcement personnel in
emergency commitments.167 These data suggest that psychiatrists'
opinions and judgments, even as to future dangerousness, may in fact
be more reliable than those judgments made by lay persons who
would have even less experience than law-enforcement officers in as-
sessing potentially violent conduct.168
Predictions of future behavior present difficulty for any deci-
sionmaker, whether it be judge, jury, law-enforcement personnel, or
mental health professional. The legal system, however, typically re-
lies on such predictions in many aspects of both civil and criminal
law.169 Assuming that psychiatric expertise is greater than that of
non-clinicians, as well as a necessary element in certain legal proceed-
ings, then the evidence should be admissible in court.170 Proponents
164. See, eg., Dershowitz, supra note 23, at 47.
165. Miller & Fiddleman, The Adequacy of Commitment Evaluations Performed by
Psychiatric and Non-Psychiatric Physicians, 10 J. OF L. & PsYCHIATRY 45 (1982).
166. Id. at 52. In experimental research, statistical significance is achieved at .05 level.
In other words, the results would indicate that only in 5 times out of one hundred
could the result have happened by chance. In this study, the results are signifi-
cantly higher, i.e., the probability of it happening by chance is one in ten
thousand.
167. Id. The researchers evaluated the written examinations performed by the re-
spective professionals. The petitions for commitment, as required by state stat-
ute, N.C. GEN. STAT. 122-58 (1979), were evaluated for evidence of both mental
illness and dangerousness, as well as to whether the evidence was descriptive or
conclusionary. Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 165, at 50.
168. The authors commented that, somewhat surprisingly, the greatest difference be-
tween law enforcement officers and physicians was found in the category of dan-
gerousness, the particular category where it was expected that law enforcement
officers would have more expertise. Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 165, at 52.
169. See Needell, supra note 143, at 425-27.
170. This assumption rests both on the Miller and Fiddleman study that suggests that
psychiatrists can provide greater and more helpful evidence to prove the neces-
sary substantive criteria in civil commitment proceedings, see supra notes 165-68
and accompanying text, and the research that demonstrates the qualitative differ-
ence between predictions for long-term sentencing decisions and those for civil
commitment purposes. See supra notes 152-55 & 160-63. In most states, involun-
tary commitment requires a finding of dangerousness as well as a specific finding
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warn that to eliminate all non-scientifically proven psychiatric evi-
dence would deprive the legal system of potentially valuable observa-
tions, opinions, and judgments. 171 In legal proceedings that involve
"mental" or "behavioral" issues, it appears more realistic to provide
untrained judges or juries with as much information as possible, par-
ticularly from physicians trained extensively in dealing with mental
disorders. Proper utilization of the traditional adversarial process can
scrutinize such evidence to determine its ultimate worth.172
Most courts have been lenient in admitting psychiatric testi-
mony.173 Generally, courts have not applied the stringent Frye
rule,174 preferring to distinguish expert opinion testimony from the
more objective "physical" evidence derived from scientific tech-
niques.s75 The scientific principles that have been held to the higher
standard of admissibility have customarily been specific mechanical
devices that suggest to the jury a certainty that may not exist in expert
testimony with its "aura of human fallibility."176 Psychiatric expert
witnesses, unlike machines, may typically have their fallibility ex-
of mental illness. See Beis, supra note 4. Psychiatric evaluation and assessment
of the individual is therefore necessary to substantiate these findings. Psychiatric
testimony in court supplies the trier-of-fact with as much information as possible
to aid in the ultimate decision to commit.
Even when a specific finding of mental illness is not mandated such as in sen-
tencing dispositions, or if a clearly defined mental illness does not exist, psychiat-
ric evidence may still provide important information about the individual to be
useful in court proceedings. See American Psychiatric Association, Draft Report
of the Task Force on the Role of Psychiatry in the Sentencing Process, 11-13.
Although predictions of dangerousness may be less reliable in this context, this
fact should not entirely preclude psychiatric testimony that may aid the fact-find-
ing process.
171. Shell, supra note 28, at 55. As one professor of law argued, the fact that "opinion
evidence is uncertain does not justify its exclusion, as long as the evidence rises
above mere conjecture or speculation." Shell, supra note 28, at 55 (quoting Rich-
ard Bonnie, Diector of the University of Virginia, Institute of Law, Psychiatry,
and Public Policy).
172. The argument in favor of liberal use of psychiatric testimony does not avert the
need to improve the current inadequacies in the adversarial process. See infra
notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
173. Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientijic Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L.
REV. 313, 323-25 (1964).
174. See Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
175. Boyce, supra note 173, at 324; Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 13.
176. Strong, supra note 175, at 13. The Frye standard has also been criticized because
little room may be left to receive evidence where professions with differing
schools of thought may disagree as to its reliability. Boyce, supra note 175, at 314.
See also Roberts, Some Observations on the Problem of the Forensic Psychiatrist,
1965 Wis. L. REv. 240, 244. This author notes that a number of schools of thought
have developed in the field of psychiatry, each with its own theoretical underpin-
ning for evaluating the mental status and treatment of a particular patient. Id.
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posed by diligent attorneys.177 As such, the testimony should be ad-
missible and the weight left to the trier-of-fact.
Many critics of psychiatric testimony argue that too few lawyers
are skilled in cross-examining psychiatrists and therefore such evi-
dence, especially predictions of dangerousness, should be severely re-
stricted or eliminated altogether.s78 Proponents of this position claim
that traditional adversarial techniques will not be effective in cutting
through the "facade" of superior expert knowledge.179 These critics
however, invariably underestimate the adversarial process by failing
to recognize that unskilled attorneys often accentuate judicial or jury
deference to psychiatric testimony by adopting a passive stance in the
courtroom. For example, the lawyer in a civil commitment proceeding
has been described as: "a stranger in a strange land without benefit of
a guidebook, map, or dictionary. Too often he shows no interest and
makes no effort to learn his way about his foreign environment."180
Successful advocacy in the civil commitment process depends,
therefore, on training lawyers both in substantive psychiatric material
and in effective litigation techniques, rather than restricting the po-
tentially useful and relevant information of psychiatric experts.1 s1 In
particular, lawyers must adopt an aggressive advocacy approach in
preparing and examining witnesses, developing appropriate jury in-
structions, and insuring that the psychiatrist demonstrate the specific-
ity and materiality of his or her data and the basis for each particular
conclusion or opinion.1 8 2 As psychiatrists seek to improve their ability
to proffer more reliable evidence on mental health issues, lawyers
must also pursue more effective techniques in presenting and utilizing
such testimony in court. Lawyers who abdicate their advocacy respon-
sibilities in mental health proceedings by neglecting traditional adver-
sarial and evidentiary procedures should not be heard to complain
about claimed deficiencies in the testimony of expert witnesses.1 8 3
177. See, e.g., Cooper, Why Psychiatrists Shun the Court: No Roomfor Maybes, 4 CAN.
LAW. 10 (1980).
178. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3414-15 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See also Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental
Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 535-36, 626 (1978).
179. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3414 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
180. Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally ill, 44
TEX. L. REV. 424 (1966). Professor Cohen characterizes the civil commitment
process as "a legal charade in which the lawyer uneasily pantomines his empty
part." Id
181. Poythress, Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment- Training Attorneys to
Cope with Expert Testimony, 2 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 2 (1978).
182. Pollack, "Psychiatric Consultation for the Court," in EFFECTrvE UTILIZATION OF
PsYcuATmic EVIDENCE 71, 91 (1972).
183. Certainly a lawyer who abandons a client's interest because of his or her own
inadequacies increases the likelihood of erroneous decisions. It is no excuse for
unskilled lawyers that courts rarely overturn decisions on the constitutional
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VI. CONCLUSION
The debate over the admissibility of psychiatric predictions of fu-
ture dangerousness has raged for over two decades and shows little
sign of abating. In the Barefoot decision, the United States Supreme
Court perceived no constitutional barrier to applying ordinary rules of
evidence governing the use of psychiatric expert testimony, even in
capital cases involving the death penalty.184 The Court held that ex-
pert testimony, including hypothetical questions as to potential dan-
gerousness, may be admitted as evidence to aid the trier-of-fact. 8 5
Further, any differences among experts ultimately go to the weight of
the evidence and not to the admissibility of the testimony. 8 6 Thus,
the Court's sweeping acceptance of such evidence in a capital case
leaves little doubt that it will permit similar judgments, predictions,
and opinions in civil commitment proceedings to authorize coerced
hospitalization of mentally ill individuals.
Although it is doubtful that psychiatrists will ever be able to pre-
dict future violence with 100 percent accuracy, recent research does
indicate that psychiatrists can provide useful and sufficiently reliable
information to aid the trier-of-fact in determining the need for emer-
gency and extended involuntary detention. 8 7 As indicated in this Ar-
ticle, the admissibility of psychiatric testimony suggests two areas in
need of immediate reform.
First, state statutes that require a finding of dangerousness to in-
voke civil commitment must be more precise and narrow to permit
more effective utilization of the information by the trier-of-fact and to
reduce total deference to psychiatric opinions and judgments.188 Sev-
eral commentators support quantifying statutes into "probabilistic"
terms to reduce the "guess-work" often necessitated by vague, general
substantive criteria. 8 9 Psychiatrists would then proffer testimony on
the issue of dangerousness based on the existence of given characteris-
ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. The constitutional controversy with
respect to psychiatric opinions may be a creation of attorneys' transference of
their own constitutional responsibilities.
184. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3400 (1983).
185. Id. at 3399.
186. Id Once the testimony is admitted, the trier-of-fact (whether judge or jury) has
the duty to weigh all evidence, to sort out true from false testimony, and to give
greater or lesser credence to one expert's opinions over another. Id
187. See supra notes 146-68 and acompanying text.
188. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Dix, supra note 1 at 142-43; Monahan & Wexler, A Definite Maybe:
Proof and Probability in Civil Commitment, 2 L. AND HUM. BEHAv. 37 (1978);
Morse, Law and Mental Health Professionals: The Limits of Expertise, in PRO-
FESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 389 (1978). Two authors suggest that it may be possible
to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that an individual possesses a set of given
characteristics and those characteristics "probabilistic" association with violent
behavior. Monahan & Wexler, supra, at 39.
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tics and their probable association with violent behavior.19 0 The court
(or jury) would ultimately determine if the probability meets the legal
criteria in question.19 1
Second, attorneys must become more skilled and proficient in liti-
gation techniques in civil commitment hearings. Psychiatric opinions
and predictions must be tested in the courtroom to achieve an even
greater level of reliability. 9 2 Any weaknesses in the testimony must
be exposed at trial so that the adversary process can accurately sepa-
rate the reliable from the unreliable evidence.19 3 Lack of attorney ex-
pertise or competency is not a sufficient reason to convert traditional
rules of evidence into a constitutional rule barring an entire category
of expert textimony that is both relevant and useful to the particular
trier-of-fact.194
190. Monahan & Wexler, supra note 189, at 39-40.
191. Morse, supra note 189, at 397.
192. Cohen, supra note 146, at 37-39; Monahan & Wexler, supra note 189, at 39.
193. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3398 (1983).
194. Id Cf. id at 3414-15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun argues that
seldom will all attorneys, as well as the trial judge, be highly experienced and
skilled in the law and techniques of advocacy in sophisticated matters of
medicine, psychiatry, and psychology. To the contrary, attorneys in a variety of
specialties customarily develop a sufficient level of experience to successfully ad-
vocate their client's interest.
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